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Toward a Genealogy of Aryan Morality: Nietzsche and Jacolliot
Thomas Paul Bonfiglio

While Nietzsche’s writings of the late 1880s reveal waxing interests in Hinduism, Sanskrit
philology, Aryan culture, and the related Indo-European hypothesis, these interests have been
remarkably understudied by Nietzsche scholarship, with the exception of a scant few articles that
have recently appeared.1 The presence of the aforementioned topics was crucial for the
configuration of the works written in 1887 and 1888: On the Genealogy of Morality, The
Twilight of the Idols, and The Antichrist, as well as for some of the notions at hand in Nietzsche’s
correspondence with Heinrich Köselitz, but the provenance of the ideas that codetermined those
works and generated their philosophies has never been properly examined. It is imperative to
analyze and interpret Nietzsche’s sources and his reception and development of them, in order to
better understand the texts of one of the most complex and innovative philosophers of the
nineteenth century. This study is itself a genealogy that offers an account of the etiology of some
of the highly salient and fundamental aspects of Nietzsche’s work of the period in question, such
as the concepts of Jewish and Christian morality and psychology, Aryan ideology,
miscegenation, the caste system, and the figure of the outcast (Chandala), as well as the idea of
the human as the measurer, which also offers a curious epistemological excursus on the nature of
human thought.
There are several factors that recommend that this study be both philosophical and
philological in orientation. First, the ideologies present in the material studied here themselves
arise from Nietzsche’s philological inquiries. It was the milieu of modern comparative historical
linguistics, which originated in Germany in the nineteenth century, that provided the context for
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the development of Nietzsche’s ideas as examined here. This milieu was ridden with romantic
notions of the prehistoric origins of European “race,” language, and culture, and it was
Nietzsche’s own interest in those romantic accounts and in comparative philology that motivated
the construction of some of the ideologies present in his later works. It is within the matrix of
philology and philosophy that these ideas arose in a codeterminative, symbiotic relationship; in
short, one may posit the birth of Aryan morality from the spirit of nineteenth century historical
linguistics. It was Glen Most, who recently, and in these very pages, lamented the dearth of
scholarship on Nietzsche’s philological writings, observing that they had “suffered a bleak
existence in a remote corner of the history of philosophy and culture.”2 Most reminds us that, in
order to properly historicize the philosophy of Nietzsche, scholarship must not lose sight of the
fact “that philology in the decades before Nietzsche’s birth occupied somewhat the same position
in the German academic landscape that genetic research does now.”3 Here, the comparison with
genetics is an auspicious one, as it underscores the genealogical models of inquiry common to
both disciplines, models both performed and consciously problematized by Nietzsche.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the ideas of Nietzsche studied here are those of
a philosophy of and in language, for Nietzsche himself was among the first to discuss the
(post)modern notions of linguistic relativity and of the ineluctability of language in thought,
problems that occupied subsequent thinkers from Benjamin Whorf to the French
poststructuralists. Nietzsche’s primacy in the poststructuralist discourse of the late twentieth
century—the discourse that relativizes and subsumes knowledge to textual language—is
underscored by the fact that his essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” (1873)
became so frequently employed in poststructuralist circles, that it won the informal designation
of “the Yale essay.”
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Thus this study proceeds within the matrix of philosophy and philology, contextualizing
Nietzsche’s ideas in the medium of linguistic exchange, as determined by the dynamics of
reading and misreading in translation, and in translation of translation. For such an inquiry,
reference to original sources is indispensable. Our inquiry begins in a situation of linguistic
displacement, in France, with an anecdote that frames the problems of reference.
In1976, the Parisian publishing house Editions d’Aujourd’hui printed a facsimile edition
of Lois de Manou, a translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra that was completed in 1830 by
Auguste Loiseleur-Deslongchamps. The back cover of the book displayed the following quote
from Nietzsche:
In the past few weeks, I learned something very important: I discovered the Code
of Manu. This entirely Aryan product, a sacerdotal moral code based on the
Vedas, on the idea of castes, and on ancient traditions—the character of which is
not pessimistic, although it is still quite sacerdotal—this product completes my
ideas on religion in a most curious way. I must admit having the impression that
everything else we know of great moral codes seems to be simply an imitation
thereof, if not a caricature, beginning with Egyptian morality; and it seems to me
that even Plato himself was merely well educated by a Brahman. In addition, the
Jews give the impression of a race of Chandalas who learned from their masters
the principles, according to which a priestly caste ascends to power and organizes
a people.4
This is familiar to many as a selective translation of Nietzsche’s letter to Köselitz of May 31,
1888, a translation that would be a faithful one, were it not for one significant omission in the
very first sentence. Nietzsche says that he discovered the book “in French translation, done in
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India under strict surveillance by high-ranking priests and scholars.”5 It is indeed odd that a
comment on the scholarly integrity of this French version is omitted, but that the antisemitic
aspect is retained. This is perhaps a blind spot occluded by the enthusiasm of the contemporary
ideology. This citation on the back cover reflects the sentiments of the post-1968 era that
celebrated the creative energies of leftist revolution, sentiments that were interested in a narrow
configuration of Nietzsche as an advocate of Dionysian rebellion, and his high profile within this
ideology made him an excellent, albeit unwitting advertising agent. Coupled with the concurrent
waxing interest in eastern mysticism, Nietzsche’s admiration of the Mānavadharmaçāstra
offered a prime opportunity for the perspicacious bookseller. The only problem is that in the
letter cited here, Nietzsche was talking about a different translation altogether. He had indeed
read the Mānavadharmaçāstra in French, but not the version by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps that
he was ostensibly endorsing. He had, instead, read Louis Jacolliot, Les législateurs religieux:
Manu, Moïse, Mahommet,6 published in 1876. This is the translation found in his library.
Auguste Loiseleur-Deslongchamps (1805-1840) published the first scholarly French
translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra. He based it upon the same manuscripts used by the first
great English sanskritist William Jones (1746-1794), whose Institutions of Hindu Law, or the
Ordinances of Menu,7 published in Calcutta in 1794, constituted the first English translation of
this major work of Hindu law. Jones based his translation upon the gloss of Culluca Bhatta from
the province of Bengal. When Loiseleur-Deslongchamps decided to provide Francophone
Europe with a translation, he followed Jones closely and based his work on the manuscript of
Culluca, as well. Both the translations by Jones and by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps, although
superseded by others since, are still well recognized by Sanskrit scholars.8
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Louis Jacolliot (1837-1890) was a provincial chief justice in the former French colony of
Chandernagore, which lay about 30 kilometers north of Calcutta, and he also traveled to Tamil
Nadu in southern India, where he came upon the manuscript that he translated. He is unknown to
the current generation of Sanskritists and has, with the exception of a recent biographical essay,9
all but disappeared from contemporary French historical discourse: the current French
encyclopedia La grande Larousse makes no mention of him at all, but La grande encyclopédie of
the 1890s says of Jacolliot, “A French writer, … he assembled during his long stay in India a
mass of material that helped him publish quite interesting works, in which, however, romanesque
tendencies often took him beyond scientific veracity, so that one might rather consider him to be
more of a brilliant popularizer than a scholar or historian.”10 Also, the Grand dictionnaire
universel du xixe siècle remarks, “We believe the author did not delve sufficiently into the fine
work … of Max Müller … and that he became seduced by an overly systematic view of his
subject.”11
In Indic mythology, Manu is said to be the first human, the son of Brahma, and the
attributed author of the Mānavadharmaçāstra, the date of composition of which is estimated to
be sometime between the years –100 and +100. It prescribes codes of behavior, especially
pertaining to interaction among castes. It is the oldest document of Hindu law, which Manu is
said to have received directly from Brahma. The literal meaning of Mānavadharmaçāstra is
“Manu’s manual on proper behavior.”
There was also, however, a German version of the Mānavadharmaçāstra available to
Nietzsche. It was J. C. Hüttner, Hindu-Gesetzbuch, oder Menu’s Verordnungen, nach Cullucas
Erläuterungen,12 published in 1797. This was a German translation of William Jones’s English
translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra and not a direct conversion from Sanskrit into German.
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It is a matter of great curiosity as to why Nietzsche did not use Hüttner’s German version, which
would have offered him the least linguistic resistance, or the English translation done by Jones,
of whose existence he would have undoubtedly learned in the course of his dabblings in Sanskrit
etymology and Hindu philosophy. It is also a matter of speculation how Nietzsche came upon the
translation done by Jacolliot instead of the one done by Loiseleur-Deslongchamps. Although
Jacolliot’s version was more recent by a margin of more than forty years, there were several
republications of Loiseleur-Deslongchamps’s well-regarded Lois de Manou to compete with it.
Perhaps the major factor motivating Nietzsche’s preference was not the accessibility a given
edition, nor its scholarly reputation, but instead the presence or absence of ideologically
appropriate annotations. Neither Institutions of Hindu Law, nor Lois de Manou contains much
annotation at all, but Jacolliot’s Les législateurs religieux is heavily and most oddly annotated,
and it was upon these annotations that Nietzsche configured his notions of Aryan and Semitic
cultures.
It is best to examine Nietzsche’s letter to Heinrich Köselitz in the original; Nietzsche
says:
These past few weeks have offered a very important lesson: I found the lawbook
of Manu in French translation, done in India under strict surveillance by highranking priests and scholars. This absolutely Aryan product, a sacerdotal moral
code based on the Vedas, on notions of castes and ancient traditions—not
pessimistically, though still sacerdotal it may be—has expanded my ideas on
religion in a most remarkable way. I have to admit having the impression that
everything else that we know about moral laws seems to be just an imitation of
this, even a caricature: first of all Egypticism, but even Plato seems to me, in all
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major points, to have simply been well educated by a Brahman. The Jews look
like a race of Chandalas, who learn principles from their lords, by means of which
priesthood becomes lord and organizes a people … and the Chinese, too, seem to
have produced their Confucius and Lao-tse under the influence of this ancient
classical lawbook. Medieval institutions look like a fabulous attempt to recover
all the ideas, upon which ancient Indo-Aryan society was based—but with
pessimistic values that have their origin in the basis of racial decadence. —The
Jews seem, here as well, to be simply “imitators”—they invent nothing.13 (KGB
3/5, 325)
Nietzsche first frames this French translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra as one of lofty origin,
having been supervised by highly educated Brahmans. It is a lawbook that is not only Aryan, but
absolutely Aryan, and it is also a moral code that justifies the existence of a caste system.
Nietzsche sees it as doing so non-pessimistically, that is, in an affirmative manner that only seeks
to codify a system that is already in place, and not in reaction against incipient decline in an
effort to insure the system against degeneration. It is thus organizational but not reactionary,
while its medieval European permutation, meaning the caste system of the middle ages, enforces
its own social structure in a pessimistic fashion, that is, in an act of self-preservation and in the
face of the decline of the heroic nobility and the ascent of the slave mentality. Nietzsche also
presents the code of Manu as being of ancient lineage, if not of ultimate anteriority and thus
originality. It is the source for all derivative moralities: Egyptian, Platonic, Jewish, and Chinese.
Thus here, Nietzsche does not seem to be exempt from the influence of the romantic orientalism
of the nineteenth century that sought to locate the origins of European culture in Hinduism and in
the Sanskrit language, an ideology that operated on a distinctly racial axis. It is interesting to note
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the implicit etiology present in Nietzsche’s discourse. It is as if a romantic notion of an original
point were at work, or better at play here, in an almost biblical fashion. Manu is the first human,
an Adamic figure, who must also of necessity be Aryan. Moreover, India is depicted as a kind of
point of dispersion not only for political, but also for philosophical, cultural, religious, and moral
systems as well. For Nietzsche, the subaltern nature of Jewish origin excludes Jews from
creativity; they remain middlemen.
It is most interesting to see how Nietzsche situates Jews in this context: he refers to them
as a “race of Chandalas” (Tschandala-Rasse), a concept gleaned from his readings of Jacolliot.
The term originates in the Sanskrit candāla, which refers to the lowest class of India, the outcasts
or untouchables, who actually occupied a status below that of the four formal castes of brahma
(sacerdotal), ksatriya (nobility), vaiśya (farmer or merchant), and śūdra (slave). A child of a
brahma father and a śūdra mother, a candāla was considered to be the lowest of humans.14 The
word literally means “the worst among,” and is from the root canda, meaning “fierce,” “violent,”
or “cruel.” The candāla were literally “out-cast,” in the sense of being so low as to be outside of
the caste system itself.
While Nietzsche correctly understands the caste divisions, as indicated in The Twilight of
the Idols: “The task here is to raise no less than four races at once: a sacerdotal, a military, a
commercial-agricultural, and finally a race of servants, the Sudras,”15 and Jacolliot does, as well:
“The fours castes are: the Brahmans, or priests; the Kshatria, or kings; the Vaisias, or merchants
and farmers; the Sudras, or slaves,”16 both prefer to see a rigidity and inflexibility in the Indian
caste system that guards against cross-caste intermarriage and preserves an Aryan “purity,”
especially in the upper caste of Brahman. Moreover, both seem to be unaware that the caste
system was a later development in the history of Hinduism. In the early Vedic period, there is no
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evidence of a caste system or of any restrictions on inter-ethnic marriage at all.17 The caste
system itself was a later development and tended to solidify when Muslims started settling in
northern India in the seventh century.18 Thus its provenance is not endogenous, but instead
precipitated by the external incursions that threatened the political and economic integrity of
India.
The traditional Hindu system divided the śūdra off from the other three castes,
distinguishing brahma, ksatriya, and vaiśya as twice-born and the śūdra as only born once.
While Hinduism did develop very complicated rules on all forms of intercourse among members
of different castes and came to discourage inter-caste marriage in general, it was most
condemnatory of marriage between brahma and śūdra, and it was this union that produced the
candāla. Jacolliot, however, misunderstands the candāla as the offspring of any inter-caste
marriage, referring to them as the people of “des classes mêlées” (99). Jacolliot’s choice of the
phrase “classes mêlées” is here a very motivated one. He introduces it already at the beginning of
his translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra, when the great sages ask Manu to explain the major
castes (varna) as well as the antaraprabhava, a term that Bühler judiciously elects to render as
“the intermediate ones.”19 The word literally means “those of inter-origin” and carries neutral
connotations, which certainly cannot be said of the phrase that Jacolliot chooses: he clearly had
at his disposal the pleasant term intermédiare (intermediate), but the semantic field of mêlée, on
the other hand, includes notions of mixture, confusion, and conflict and initiates a chain of
substitutions that eventually evokes the specter of miscegenation and the abhorrence of
interracial marriage.
Nietzsche largely follows Jacolliot on this theme but underscores the relative
egregiousness of the combination of brahma and śūdra, all the while, however, seeking to
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emphasize the Aryan purity of the sacerdotal caste: “For a Brahman who conjoins with a Sudra
(from the race of servants) and has a son by her, there is no possible atonement on earth”20
(KGW 8/3, 302). Moreover, Nietzsche’s use of terms such as “race” (Rasse) and “raise”
(züchten) above underscores the racial focus of his project, which is especially forceful in the
term züchten, a verb that indicates not only breeding, but also domestication, and carries
resonances of discipline and punishment via its derivative züchtigen (to punish). The keystone
fabrication in the construction of the ideologies of both Nietzsche and Jacolliot, however, and the
one that enables the substitutive chain of slave—Jew—Christian, is the connection between the
Jews and the candāla, which is not at all an idea that exists in the text of the
Mānavadharmaçāstra itself; it is found only in Jacolliot’s specious annotations to the text, which
provide a quite curious extension of the image of the outcasts. It is worth noting, however, that
the connection that Nietzsche constructs between the Jews and the candāla implies a partial
sibling relationship; if Jews have their origin in the candāla, who, in turn, are the offspring of
Aryan and non-Aryan parents, then Jews are ultimately related to Aryans. This connection helps
to make sense of the otherwise bewildering fragment found in Nietzsche’s Nachlass, in which he
holds “that the Semitic race belongs to the Indo-European one”21 (KGW 7/1, 10).
Nietzsche’s use of the ideas of Jacolliot and the image of India is, at best, a quite
selective one. While On the Genealogy of Morality takes a condemnatory view of the ascetic and
corporophobic elements in the western philosophical tradition, Nietzsche cannot, however,
jettison that tradition altogether. Similarly, his Indophilia must also be problematized by
paradoxes, for he must know that the culture that he is elevating above the west is also one
ridden with extreme asceticism and ultimate nihilism. In Friedrich Nietzsches Der Antichrist:
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Ein philosophisch-historischer Kommentar, Andreas Sommer offers a useful assessment of this
riddle:
Is intellectualism (Geistigkeit) natural and affirmative, or does this intellectualism
deny (as is presumably the case with the “priests” of Judaism and Christianity)
this very naturalness, the world? The Antichrist’s answer to this question sounds
contradictory, so that one cannot ultimately decide if the new morality of “the
few”—along with its confessional “asceticism”—is life-affirming or hostile to life
itself. The only way out of this trap is benevolently to take the skeptical metastandpoint von #54 and hold isostheny to be the most essential … intellectuality
would then be in principle neither life-affirming nor life-negating.22
Granting intellectualism a neutral value thus enables Nietzsche to maintain his perception of the
superiority and originality of Indian thought and recover sources antecedent to those of the
western tradition. Having read Deussen’s translations of the Sutras,23 Nietzsche wrote to Köselitz
in September 1887, saying that the texts preempt Kantianism by a few thousand years and that
they sound like the Critique of Pure Reason in spots. Of Deussen’s Das System des Vedanta,24
which he mentions only twice, he says that it preempts or anticipates “Kantianism, atomism,
nihilism” (KGB 3/5, 144). Thus Nietzsche succeeds in assembling a kind of utopian composite,
albeit paradoxical, of India as the source of idealism, intellect, race, and hierarchy.
Nietzsche’s credulous acceptance of Jacolliot’s speculations is indeed striking, especially
in view of his relationships with the linguists of the era. Max Müller sharply criticized Jacolliot’s
scholarship in his Einleitung in die vergleichende Religionswissenschaft, which Nietzsche
borrowed from the Basel library on October 22, 1875.25 (This also raises the possibility that
Nietzsche could have known about Jacolliot much earlier than the first attestation in the letter to
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Köselitz of 1888.) Müller says, in the Einleitung, “I must note here that a book that appeared
recently, and that received a curiously high degree of attention, La Bible dans l’Inde, by Jacolliot
... is a most unfortunate fabrication. As it contains passages from the holy scriptures that are not
in the original, but instead in a free French translation, no scholar of Sanskrit literature would
doubt for a moment that these are inventions.”26 Müller is referring to Jacolliot’s, La Bible dans
l’Inde, vie de Iezeus Christna (1869),27 which contains fabulous speculations on the
correspondences between India and the occident. Jacolliot actually tries to connect Zeus with
Jesus via the fabricated name Iezeus, an idea that he later modified in an equally quixotic
distortion. In 1874, he published Christna et le Christ,28 in which he claims that the laws of
Manu were composed in 13,300 BC, and that Jesus Christ is an invented figure, a later fiction
based on the historical personage of Krishna.
A closer examination of Jacolliot’s Mānavadharmaçāstra, the one that Nietzsche read,
helps to illuminate the source of some of Nietzsche’s ideas as put forth in The Antichrist and On
the Genealogy of Morality. In his introduction, Jacolliot says, “William Jones and Loiseleur
Deslongchamps had translated the Manu of the north; I wanted to translate the Manu of the south
… The two works certainly originate in two different eras and two different civilizations. For
more than five hundred years, Muslims suppressed the cult of Brahma in the north. They burned
sacred books and temples. The south, on the other hand, escaped the proselytism of the sword
and was able to preserve the lawbooks in all their purity.”29 In the north, however, “customs
became changed by contact abroad, and under the harsh law of the Koran.”30 He speaks of “the
criticism leveled by the pundits of the south against the Brahmans of the north for having altered
the sacred texts.”31 Thus Jacolliot sought a version of the Mānavadharmaçāstra from the south
of India, because it would be farther away from the Arabs, and thus, in his opinion, “purer.” It is
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indeed odd that Jacolliot, such a fervent participant in the racial ideologies of late nineteenth
century Europe, would descend into southern India to seek such a manuscript, as the south has
the highest concentration of non-Aryan aboriginal Dravidians, who would be seen, in the race
conscious paradigm of that era, as even more removed from Indo-Europeans than the Arabs who
were threatening the north.
In a volley of inductive leaps based on the most minimal of correspondences, Jacolliot
then tries to show that all civilization as we know it has its source in India, has been inherited by
Aryans, and either copied or corrupted by Semites. In his annotations on the figure of Narayana,
“or he who moves on the waters,”32 he says, “Unconscious copyist; all the author of Genesis did
was copy the Hindu and Chaldean traditions.”33 In the figure of Naya, the spirit that is divided
into separate male and female parts, he sees the source of “the legend of woman from the side of
man.”34 On the Hindu tradition of anointing with holy oil, he says, “The texts of these
ceremonies were copied by Christianity.”35 He has a similar view on the origin of the practice of
shaving the head: “All priests of the far east had tonsures already at a young age … this sign of
the sacerdotal caste, preserved over the ages, became a Christian symbol.”36 On the custom of
facing east while eating, he says, “Mohammed was inspired by these principles.”37 On the
practice of wiping the mouth with the thumb, he says, “Catholicism has preserved these practices
in certain ceremonies.”38 For Jacolliot, the Bible is simply a “code of pillage and debauchery.”39
Jacolliot’s free associations have linguistic correlates as well: “All the castes of India
spoke and still speak agglutinating languages, and we know equally well that this was the
distinctive trait of the original Chaldean-Babylonian idioms.”40 This is a wonderful paralogism:
Indians speak agglutinating languages; Chaldean and Babylonian are agglutinating languages;
therefore, Chaldeans and Babylonians are Indians. On the general customs of India, he says,
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“How far removed we are from the Semitic customs, stupid and gross, customs of nomadic
thugs.”41 These were nomads who were expelled from the garden of India: “The emigrations of
the disinherited, the Hindu Chandala, … their habits of writing from right to left, imposed
circumcision, which ended up passing into custom, their nomadic practices … this is the
veritable source of the nations that we call Semitic.”42 It is important to note that the significant
image of circumcision, which facilitates the connection between the candāla and Jews, is
produced by Jacolliot’s misreading a Sanskrit word as referring to circumcision. The word that
he misreads is dauçcarmayam, which Bühler translates as “diseased skin.”43 According to
Jacolliot, the law of Manu says, “Those who have been circumcised, and who thus are rejected
into the impure class of the Chandala … those who can only read from right to left, are excluded
from funeral rites.”44 Thus he concludes that “the so-called Semites would only be the
descendants of the Hindu Chandala,”45 and that “Chaldeans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Syrians,
Phoenicians, and Arabs owe their origin to the various tribes of Chandala who emigrated from
Hindustan at different epochs … in turn, the Hebrews were then to become the product of
Chaldean emigration.”46 It is interesting to note that here, Jacolliot reveals himself as an antiSemite in the broadest linguistic sense of the term, disdaining not only Arabic and Hebrew
speakers, but also an associative assortment of north Africans and southwest Asians. Here,
however, is an important point of bifurcation between Nietzsche and Jacolliot. Nietzsche does
not at all share in Jacolliot’s wholesale rejection of all that is Semitic. Almond has recently
illuminated the heroic, life-affirming aspects that Nietzsche found in Islam and proposes that, for
Nietzsche, “Islam forms the acceptable face of Semitism.”47
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In The Twilight of the Idols, when Nietzsche speaks of “The Improvers of Humanity,” it
is clear that he is making unreflective use of Jacolliot’s ideas. He emphasizes the quarantine-like
exclusion of the candāla:
The results of these forced hygienic measures were considerable: deadly
epidemics, horrible sexual diseases and, moreover, “the law of the knife,”
ordering circumcision for male children and the removal of the labia for female
children. –Manu himself says, “The Chandala are the fruit of adultery, incest, and
crime (–this is the necessary consequence of the concept of breeding). For clothes,
they are to have only the rags of corpses, for dishes only broken vessels, for
jewelry only old iron, for worship only the evil gods; they are to wander from
place to place without rest. They are forbidden to write from left to right and to
use the right hand for writing: the use of the right hand and the left-to-right
direction is solely reserved for the virtuous, the people of race.”48 (KGW 6/3, 95)
It is interesting to note here how Nietzsche foregrounds the figure of circumcision, referring to it
as “the law of the knife” (das Gesetz des Messers). It serves as a symbolic castration and
disempowerment of the lowest class. The elements of disempowerment are crucial to Nietzsche’s
project, which is to arrive at a hierarchic ontology, one that justifies a discourse of power and
sees a caste system as crucial to the nature and emergence of the noble morality. Thus he seeks
to conclude, in The Antichrist, that “the order of the castes, the highest, dominating law, is but
the sanctioning of a natural order, of a natural legality of the highest rank, over which no
arbitrariness, no ‘modern idea’ has any power”49 (KGW 6/3, 240). This is the ultimate locus of
power that necessitates the maintenance and deployment of that very power. In The Twilight of
the Idols, he says, “But even this organization had need to be dreadful,—not, in this case, in
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battle with the beast, but instead with its opposite concept, the human of no breeding, the human
mishmash, the Chandala”50 (KGW 6/3, 94).
One also sees here the presence of Jacolliot’s discussion of the prescriptions on writing.
Jacolliot says, “We are the people of the right hand, which means that we come from the high
castes and have the right to use the right hand … all the so-called Semites use the left hand.”51
These assertions contain word plays on the meanings of “right,” which are clearly visible in
Jacolliot’s juxtaposition of right/right (droit/droite), implying that the higher castes are those
who are right, and who have the right to use the right hand. Perhaps also implicit in Nietzsche’s
adaptation of Jacolliot are similar allusions to the homophonies of “right” (Recht/rechts). Further
along in The Antichrist, Nietzsche says, “The highest class—I call them the fewest—also have,
as the perfect one, the right of the fewest”52 (KGW 6/3, 240).
Nietzsche scholarship has not exactly been speedy in assessing the source of Nietzsche’s
reception of the laws of Manu. It was not until 1987 that the first formal study on Nietzsche and
Jacolliot appeared. In that year, Nietzsche-Studien published “Nietzsche und das Gesetzbuch des
Manu”53 by the German Indologist Annemarie Etter, who restricts her study to the accuracy of
Jacolliot’s translations and the plausibility of his speculations on Hindu culture. She generally
brackets the philosophical and ideological elements at hand, especially in their reception by
Nietzsche. Etter points out, however, that nowhere in the dharmaçāstra of Manu are to be found
prescriptions on circumcision, nor on writing from right to left, nor on writing with the left hand.
Again, Nietzsche’s acceptance at face value of Jacolliot’s suppositions is surprising. The Sanskrit
philologists with whom he was acquainted, such as Ernst Windisch, already knew that the
tradition of the classical Sanskrit texts was oral and not written. There were, in fact, prescriptions
against writing down the sacred works. They were transmitted orally and did not start being
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transcribed until the end of the first millennium. Moreover, if these prescriptions against writing
from right to left or against circumcision have any presence in the manuscript that Jacolliot
purports to have used, they would be, as Etter has proposed, a “response to the penetration of
Muslims into India.”54 This is, however, irrelevant in any case; since Mohammed was born in the
sixth century (563), there could have been no such reaction in the original dharmaçāstra of
Manu. Etter holds that Jacolliot’s manuscript must have been written long after the original
one.55
Both Nietzsche and Jacolliot valorize the anteriority and superiority of the Hindu religion
vis-à-vis Christianity. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche says of Christianity, “Only bad purposes:
poisoning, slander, denial of life, despising the body, the humiliation and self-deprecation of the
human via the concept of sin,—and its methods are bad, too. —I read the lawbook of Manu with
the opposite feeling, an incomparably intellectual and superior work; to mention it along with the
Bible, even in one breath, would be a sin against the intellect”56 (KGW 6/3, 235-236). Similar
images of decline and decadence in the biblical tradition are visible in Jacolliot, as well: “And
one might say that goodness, virtue, duty, and the ideas of the unity of God and the trinity, and
the immortality of the soul, have assumed, in India, the most elevated character that could be
attributed to them.”57 Ideas of anteriority are also observable in Nietzsche’s application of
Jacolliot’s derivation of Semitic systems from Aryan ones. Nietzsche says, in the Nachlass, “The
development of the Jewish sacerdotal state is not original: they became acquainted with that
system in Babylon: the system is Aryan”58 (KGW 8/3, 178). This is a schema that is inherited by
the slave class, in Nietzsche’s view, and in Jacolliot’s, as well: “The habits of slavery, of
isolation, … often imposed on the Chandala … have borne among them vices against nature …
all peoples called Semitic were and still are contaminated by them.59 Similarly, Jacolliot speaks
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of “the insurgent Egyptian pariahs who call themselves the Hebrews.”60 In The Twilight of the
Idols, Nietzsche has similar images of an unnatural revolt of those in squalor: “It is the antiAryan religion par excellence: Christianity as the transvaluation of all Aryan values, the victory
of the values of the Chandala, the gospel preached to the poor, the low ones, the collective
uprising of all that is downtrodden, miserable, unsuccessful, unfortunate, against the “race”—the
immortal revenge of the Chandala as the religion of love”61 (KGW 6/3, 95-96). One of the major
theses in the Genealogy concerns the placement of Judaism and Christianity on a continuum and
the perception of Christian morality as a more damaging and egregious derivative of the values
put forth in the Old Testament. Indeed, one might characterize Nietzsche’s view of New
Testament morality as a kind of “Christian Semitism,” and one finds a parallel expression in
Jacolliot, as well: “In copying the Hindu traditions, Christian Semitism added whatever it
wanted.”62
There are also other similarities to be found between Jacolliot’s ideas and those expressed
by Nietzsche in the Genealogy that could support the speculation that Nietzsche may have indeed
been familiar with Jacolliot’s work earlier than previously thought. For instance, the following
supposition by Jacolliot about the candāla displays some curious similarities to Nietzsche’s ideas
on the slave mentality:
This class had no legal existence at all … like all races abandoned to the life of
nature, the Chandala developed with extraordinary rapidity. Originating from the
criminals of all the castes, even the castes of Brahmans and Kshatriyas, they
wasted no time in forming a group that was a lot more intelligent and skillful than
the average Sudra or even Vaisia.63
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In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche speaks of the psychology of ressentiment in the
slave class, here, specifically the slave class of Judeo-Christian origin:
His soul squints; his mind likes hiding places, short cuts, and back doors,
everything that is hidden looks like his world, his security, his refreshment; he
knows how to use silence, how not to forget, how to wait, how to minify himself
for the time being, how to discourage himself. Such a race of ressentimenthumans would wind up being cleverer than any other noble race, they would also
honor cleverness in a very different way: namely, as an existential necessity of
utmost importance.64 (KGW 6/2, 286-287)
There are parallel ideas here concerning a class that is coerced by the circumstances of
disenfranchisement into being disingenuous and manipulative. Jacolliot’s lack of precision
describes the candāla here as a class of criminals, whereas he had earlier characterized them as
simply those of mixed class. They have become more cunning than vaiśya and śūdra but not the
sacerdotal and noble castes, whereas for Nietzsche, those of Judeo-Christian ressentiment, whom
he sees as a “race of Chandalas,” have indeed succeeded in outwitting the nobility.
Nietzsche’s reception of Jacolliot’s hierarchicalism goes well beyond simple
justifications of the necessity to have castes. Nietzsche builds a hierarchical consciousness into
the ontology of human nature and places it at the very foundation of human thought. In On the
Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche speaks of
the oldest and most primal interpersonal relationship there is … the one between
buyer and seller, lender and debtor: it was here that people first met, here that
people measured themselves against each other … setting prices, measuring
value, coming up with equivalents and exchanging them—this so preoccupied the
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initial human thought processes, that they constitute, in a certain sense, thinking
in itself. Perhaps our word “man” (manas) still expresses something of this
personal feeling: man designated himself as the being that measures values,
evaluates, and measures, as the “estimating animal” in itself.65 (KGW 6/2, 322)
Nietzsche is engaged here in false etymology and seems to be conflating several Sanskrit words
at once when he invokes “manas” and represents it a signifying the human as the measuring
animal. The words are: manah “mind,” manu “human,” √mā “to measure,” and √man “to think.”
Manah, manu, and √man are all three certainly root-related, and their cognates include Latin
mens, English “to mean” and “man,” and German meinen, Mann, and Mensch. While the nuclear
form to all is indeed the verb root √man, the great nineteenth century Sanskritist Charles Lanman
advises as such: “The derivation of manu from √man, ‘think,’ is unobjectionable so far as the
form goes, but the usual explanation of manu as ‘the thinker’ defies common sense.”66 The name
Manu itself is also clearly related here, a correspondence one might have expected Nietzsche to
exploit, given his inclination to explain by associative etymology. But √mā is a separate root
altogether, and its cognates include Latin manus, “hand,” mater, “mother,” and English
“mother,” as well. Nietzsche commits the same conflation in Human, All Too Human: “The
human as the measurer. —Perhaps all human morality has its origin in the immense inner
excitement that gripped the first humans as they discovered measure and measuring, scale and
weighing (the word ‘man’ means the measuring one, he wanted to name himself after his greatest
discovery!)”67 (KGW 6/3, 192). In misunderstanding the human as the measurer-thinker,
Nietzsche is suggesting that the act of cognition itself is a measurement or estimation of self
against other; ergo, a form of class or caste consciousness must lie at the root of human culture.
Thus, by analogy, the Indian caste system is simply a manifestation of the natural order of things,
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the “sanctioning of a natural order” (Sanktion einer Natur-Ordnung). It is also important to note
that the indicated relationship between “lender and debtor” (Gläubiger und Schuldner) presented
in the passage above necessitates that the subjugated class feel guilty for its debt (schuldig for its
Schuld(en), as in the meanings of the Latin debita), thus effecting the guilt complex of the
subaltern, an idea recognizable to those familiar with the arguments in the Genealogy.
Thus one sees in Nietzsche a quite curious genealogy of Aryan morality: the ideologies of
a “race of Chandalas” marked by circumcision and responsible for the generation of Jewish and
Christian morals, of a caste system and the necessity of suppression as original to human culture,
of miscegenation, and of India as an original point for western idealism are all codetermined by
the reception of the work of a race conscious fabulist disregarded by contemporary scholarship.
In addition, the genesis of the idea of the human as the measurer stems from etymological
misanalyses of Sanskrit terms, which misanalyses aided Nietzsche in the construction of an
epistemology that accepts a priori a perception of social difference and, ultimately, stratification;
this epistemology also facilitated the ideology of caste and hierarchy. It has long been known
that Nietzsche was well acquainted with several prominent indologists, among them Paul
Deussen, Max Müller, and Ernst Windisch, who could have ameliorated many of the errors and
fanciful etymologies associated with his reception of Jacolliot. Perhaps Ahlsdorf’s terse
summation in Nietzsches Juden, neatly formulated in a noncommittal German subjunctive, is to
the point: “Nietzsche’s credulous acceptance of these curious theses, as well as his own
comments on them, might be dismissed as a sign of his approaching mental collapse.”68
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Notes

1. This article originated as a conference paper for the 2003 IAPL meeting in Leeds, UK, and has
not been influenced by David Smith’s “Nietzsche’s Hinduism, Nietzsche’s India: Another
Look,” which appeared in the Autumn 2004 issue of The Journal of Nietzsche Studies. I received
a copy of this article from Smith only after the present study had been submitted to NNS. I had,
however, provided Smith with a copy of my conference paper in August 2002, at his request.
2. Glenn Most, “Friedrich Nietzsche: Between Philosophy and Philology,” New Nietzsche
Studies 4, nos. 1 and 2 (2000), 163.
3. Ibid., 164.
4. Auguste Loiseleur-Deslongchamps, Lois de Manou (Paris: Editions d’Aujourd’hui, 1976).
This is a facsimile reproduction of: Lois de Manou (Paris: Garnier, 1830), the original work by
the same author. The original text reads: “Ces dernières semaines, j’ai appris quelque chose de
très essentiel: J’ai découvert le Code de Manou. Ce produit entièrement aryen, un code
sacerdotal de la morale basé sur les védas, sur l’idée des castes et sur des traditions archaïques—
dont le caractère n’est pas pessimiste, quelque sacerdotal qu’il reste toujours—ce produit
complète de la façon la plus curieuse mes idées sur la religion. J’avoue avoir eu l’impression que
tout ce que nous connaissons d’autre en fait de grands codes de morale ne semble en être que
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l’imitation, sinon la caricature: à commencer par la morale égyptienne; et Platon lui-même me
paraît avoir tout simplement été bien instruit par un Brahmane. A côté de cela, les Juifs font
l’effet d’une race de Tschandalas qui ont appris de leurs maîtres les principes d’après lesquels
une caste de prêtres arrive au pouvoir et organise un peuple.” (All translations in this article are
my own.)
5. Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, 31 May 1888 (no. 1041), in Nietzsche Briefwechsel. Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, eds. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montiari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984),
3.5:325. All subsequent references to Nietzsche’s correspondence are taken from this edition and
indicated parenthetically as KGB in the body of this article. The original texts reads: “In einer
französischen Übersetzung, die in Indien, unter genauer Controle der hochgestellten Priester und
Gelehrten daselbst, gemacht worden ist.”
6. Louis Jacolliot, Les législateurs religieux: Manou, Moïse, Mahommet (Paris: Librairie
internationale, 1876). All references to this work are indicated parenthetically in the endnotes.
7. William Jones, Institutes of Hindu Law; or the Ordinances of Menu (Calcutta: Printed by the
Order of Government, 1794).
8. Loiseleur-Deslongchamps’s translation was reprinted in 1996.
9. See Daniel Caracostea, “Lous-François Jacolliot (1837-1890): A Biographical Essay,”
Theosophical History 9, no. 1 (2003), 12-39.
10. La grande encyclopédie: inventaire raisonné des sciences, des lettres et des arts (Paris: H.
Lamirault et Cie, n.d.), 20:1164. The original text reads: “Littérateur français, … il recueillit
durant son long séjour dans l’Inde une quantité de matériaux qui lui ont servi à publier des
ouvrages fort intéressants, mais où le romanesque l’emporte souvent sur la vérité scientifique, en
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sorte qu’il doit être considéré plutôt comme un très brillant vulgarisateur que comme un savant
ou comme un historien.”
11. Grand dictionaire universel du xixe siècle, (Paris, 1866-1879), 9.2: 634. The original text
reads: “Nous pensons que l’auteur ne s’est pas suffisamment pénétré des beaux travaux … de
Max Müller … et qu’il s’est laissé trop entraîner par une vue systématique de son sujet.”
12. J. C. Hüttner, Hindu-Gesetzbuch, oder Menu’s Verordnungen, nach Cullucas Erläuterungen,
(Weimar, 1797).
13. “Eine wesentliche Belehrung verdanke ich diesen letzten Wochen: ich fand das Gesetzbuch
des Manu in einer französischen Übersetzung, die in Indien, unter genauer Controle der
hochgestellten Priester und Gelehrten daselbst, gemacht worden ist. Dies absolute arische
Erzeugniß, ein Priestercodex der Moral auf Grundlage der Veden, der Kasten-Vorstellung und
uralten Herkommens—nicht pessimistisch, wie sehr oft immer priesterhaft—ergänzt meine
Vorstellungen über Religion in der merkwürdigsten Weise. Ich bekenne den Eindruck, daß mir
alles Andere, was wir von großen Moral-Gesetzgebungen haben, als Nachahmung und selbst
Carikatur davon erschient: voran der Aegypticismus; aber selbst Plato scheint mir in allen
Hauptpunkten einfach bloß gut belehrt durch einen Brahmanen. Die Juden erscheinen dabei wie
eine Tschandala-Rasse, welche von ihren Herren die Principien lernt, auf die hin eine
Priesterschaft Herr wird und ein Volk organisiert ... auch die Chinesen scheinen unter dem
Eindruck dieses klassischen uralten Gesetzbuchs ihren Confucius und Laotse hervorgebracht zu
haben. Die mittelalterliche Organisation sieht wie ein wunderliches Tasten aus, alle die
Vorstellungen wieder zu gewinnen, auf denen die uralte indisch-arische Gesellschaft ruhte—
doch mit pessimistischen Werthen, die ihre Herkunft aus dem Boden der Rassendécadence
haben. —Die Juden scheinen auch hier bloß “Vermittler”—sie erfinden nichts.” (The reader will
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note that the English translation of the French version of this letter differs from the English
translation of the German original. The two different versions make slightly different
impressions, and I wanted to retain that ambiguity in the translations, in order to highlight the
problem of the ineluctabililty of language in the act of reception and interpretation.)
14. See Haripada Chakraborti, Hindu Intercaste Marriage in India (Deli: Sharada Publishing
House, 1999), 66. See also Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1989), 456.
15. Freidrich Nietzsche, Die Götzen-Dämmerung, in Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe,
eds. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montiari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 6.3:325. The
original texts reads: “Hier ist die Aufgabe gestellt, nicht weniger als vier Rassen auf einmal zu
züchten: eine priesterliche, eine kriegerische, eine händler- und ackerbauerische, endlich eine
Dienstboten-Rasse, die Sudras.” All subsequent references to Nietzsche’s works are taken from
this edition and indicated parenthetically as KGW in the body of this article.
16. “Les quatre castes sont: Les Brahmes ou prêtres; Les Xchatrias ou rois; Les Vaysias ou
marchands et cultivateurs; Les Soudras ou esclaves” (2-3).
17. See Chakraborti, Hindu Intercaste Marriage in India, 9-10.
18. Ibid., 91.
19. Mānavadharmaçāstra, 1.1; George Bühler, The Laws of Manu (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1886), 1.
20. “Für einen Brahmanen, der sich mit einer Sudra (aus der Dienstboten-Rasse) verbindet und
von ihr einen Sohn hat, giebt es auf Erden keine Art Sühnung.”
21. “Daß die semitische Rasse zur indoeuropäischen gehört.”
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22. Andreas Urs Sommer, Friedrich Nietzsches Der Antichrist: Ein philosophisch-historischer
Kommentar (Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 2000), 560. The original text reads: “Ist Geistigkeit nun
naturgewollt und weltbejahend, oder aber verneint diese Geistigkeit (wie, behauptetermaßen, bei
den ‘Priestern’ des Juden und Christentums) gerade diese Natürlichkeit, die Welt? Die
Antworten des Antichrist auf diese Frage lauten kontradiktorisch, so dass am Ende gar nicht
mehr zu entscheiden ist, ob die neue Moral der ‘Wenigsten’ mit ihrem bekennenden
‘Asketismus’ nun lebensbejahend oder lebensfeindlich ist. Den Kopf aus dieser Schlinge ziehen
kann nur, wer wohlwollend den skeptischen Metastandpunkt von #54 und damit die Isosthenie
für das Wesentliche hält ... Geistigkeit wäre weder prinzipiell lebensbejahend, noch
lebensverneinend. ”
23. Paul Deussen, Die Sutra’s des Vedanta, oder die Cariraka-Mimansa des Badarayana, nebst
dem vollständigen Commentare des Cankara. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1887).
24. Paul Deussen, Das System des Vedandta nach den Brahmasutra’s des Badarayana und dem
Commentare des Cankara über diesselben, als ein Compendium der Dogmatik des
Brahmanismus vom Standpunkte des Cankara aus. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1883).
25. Luca Crescenzi, “Verzeichnis der von Nietzsche aus der UB Basel entliehenen Bücher,”
Nietzsche-Studien 23 (1994), 435.
26. F. Max Müller, Einleitung in die vergleichende Religionswissenschaft (Straßburg: Verlag von
Karl J. Trübner, 1974), 30. The original text reads: “Ich muss aber hier bemerken, dass ein vor
kurzem erschienenes Buch, das einen merkwürdigen Grad von Aufmerksamkeit erregt hat, La
Bible dans l’Inde, von Jacolliot, ... ein schlimmeres Machwerk ist. Obgleich die darin
angeführten Stellen aus den heiligen Schriften der Brahmanen nicht im Original, sondern nur in
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einer freien französischen Übersetzung gegeben sind, so würde doch kein Kenner der SanskritLiteratur einen Augenblick darüber in Zweifel sein, daß sie Erdichtungen sind.”
27. Louis Jacolliot, La Bible dans l’Inde, vie de Iezeus Christna (Paris: A. Lacroix,
Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1869).
28. Louis Jacolliot, Christna et le Christ (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1874).
29. “William Jones et Loiseleur Deslongchamps avaient traduit le Manou du Nord; j’ai voulu
traduire le Manou du sud … les deux ouvrages appartiennent certainement à deux époques et à
deux civilisations différentes. Pendent plus de cinq siècles, les musulmans ont défendu dans le
nord le culte de Brahma. Ils ont brûlé les livres sacrés et les temples. Le sud, au contraire, a
échappé au prosélytisme du sabre, et a pu conserver les livres de la loi dans toute leur pureté”
(ii).
30. “Les mœurs s’étaient modifiées au contact de l’étranger, et sous la dure loi du Coran” (ii).
31. “Le reproche adressé par les pundits du sud aux brahmes du nord d’avoir altéré les textes
sacrés” (ii).
32. “Ou celui qui se meut sur les eaux” (5).
33. “Copiste inconscient; l’auteur de la Genèse ne faisait que copier les traditions indoues et
chaldéennes” (5).
34. “La légende de la femme formée de la côte de l’homme” (15).
35. “Ces cérémonies ont été copiées textuellement par le christianisme” (42).
36. “Tous les prêtres de l’extrême Orient, sont tonsurés dès le bas âge … Ce signe de caste
sacerdotale, conservé à travers les âges, est devenu un symbole chrétien” (44).
37. “Mahomet s’est inspiré des ces precepts” (47).
38. “Le catholicisme a préservé ces pratiques dans certaines cérémonies” (48).
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39. “Code du pillage et de la débauche” (54).
40. “Toutes les castes de l’Inde ont parlé et parlent encore des langues agglutinantes, et l’on sait
que ce fut également le caractère distinctif des primitifs idiomes chaldéo-babyloniens” (68).
41. “Comme nous sommes loin de ces mœurs sémitiques, stupides et grossières, mœurs de
brigands nomades” (91).
42. “Les émigrations des déshérités, des tchandalas indous, … leurs habitudes d’écriture de
droite à gauche, la circoncision imposée qui avait fini par passer dans les mœurs, leurs habitudes
nomades … voilà la véritable source des nations dites sémitiques” (113).
43. Jacolliot, Les législateurs religieux, 439; Mānavadharmaçāstra, 11.49.
44. “Ceux qui ont été circoncis et qui se trouvent ainsi rejetés dans la classe impure des
tchandalas … ceux qui ne peuvent lire que de droite à gauche, ne doivent pas être priés aux
cérémonies funéraires” (145).
45. “Les prétendus Sémites ne seraient que des descendants des tchandalas indous” (145).
46. “Chaldéens, Assyriens, Babyloniens, Syriens, Phéniciens et Arabes doivent donc leur origine
aux différentes tribus de tchandalas qui émigrèrent de l’Indoustan à des époques différentes … à
leur tour, les Hébreux furent le produit d’une émigration chaldéenne” (119).
47. Ian Almond, “Nietzsche’s Peace with Islam: My Enemy’s Enemy is my Friend,” German
Life and Letters 56, no. 1 (2003), 55.
48. “Der Erfolg einer solchen Sanitäts-Polizei blieb nicht aus: mörderische Seuchen, scheußliche
Geschlechtskrankheiten und darauf hin wieder “das Gesetz des Messers,” die Beschneidung für
die männlichen, die Abtragung der kleinen Schamlippen für die weiblichen Kinder anordnend.
—Manu selbst sagt: “die Tschandala sind die Frucht von Ehebruch, Incest und Verbrechen (—
dies die nothwendige Consequenz des Begriffs Züchtung). Sie sollen zu Kleidern nur die
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Lumpen von Leichnamen haben, zum Geschirr zerbrochne Töpfe, zum Schmuck altes Eisen,
zum Gottesdienst nur die bösen Geister; sie sollen ohne Ruhe von einem Ort zum andern
schweifen. Es ist ihnen verboten, von links nach rechts zu schreiben und sich der rechten Hand
zum Schreiben zu bedienen: der Gebrauch der rechten Hand und des von Links nach Rechts ist
bloss den Tugendhaften vorbehalten, den Leuten von Rasse.”
49. “Die Ordnung der Kasten, das oberste, das dominierende Gesetz, ist nur die Sanktion einer
Natur-Ordnung, Natur-Gesetzlichkeit ersten Ranges, über die keine Willkür, keine ‘moderne
Idee’ Gewalt hat.”
50. “Aber auch diese Organisation hatte nöthig, furchtbar zu sein,—nicht dies Mal im Kampf mit
der Bestie, sondern mit ihrem Gegensatz-Begriff, dem Nicht-Zucht-Menschen, dem
Mischmasch-Menschen, dem Tschandala.”
51. “Nous sommes des gens de main droite, c’est-à-dire issus des hautes castes et ayant le droit
de nous servir de la main droite … tous les prétendus Sémites se servent de la main gauche”
(119-120).
52. “Die oberste Klasse—ich nenne sie die Wenigsten—hat als die Vollkommne auch die
Vorrechte der Wenigsten.”
53. Annemarie Etter, “Nietzsche und das Gesetzbuch des Manu,” Nietzsche-Studien 16 (1987),
340-352.
54. Ibid., 349. The original text reads: “Antwort auf das Vordringen der Mohammedaner in
Indien.”
55. A recent article on Nietzsche and Manu is Thomas A. Brobjer, “The Absence of Political
Ideals in Nietzsche’s Writings: The Case of Manu and the Associated Caste-Society,” NietzscheStudien 27 (1998), 300-318. Brobjer, however, only mentions Jacolliot in a quite cursory fashion,
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reaching the insufficient conclusion that “Nietzsche probably was very little influenced by the
comments in the footnotes” (304).
56. “Nur schlechte Zwecke: Vergiftung, Verleumdung, Verneinung des Lebens, die Verachtung
des Leibes, die Herabwürdigung und Selbstschändung des Menschen durch den Begriff
Sünde,—folglich sind auch seine Mittel schlecht. —Ich lese mit einem entgegengesetzten
Gefühle das Gesetzbuch des Manu, ein unvergleichlich geistiges und überlegenes Werk, das mit
der Bibel nur in Einem Athem nennen eine Sünde wider den Geist wäre.”
57. “Et qu’on nous dise si le bien, la vertu, le devoir et les idées d’unité de Dieu et de trinité, et
d’immortalité de l’âme, n’ont pas revêtu dans l’Inde le caractère le plus élevé qui puisse leur être
donné …” (94).
58. “Die Entwicklung des jüdischen Priesterstaates ist nicht original: sie haben das Schema in
Babylon kennen gelernt: das Schema ist arisch.”
59. “Les habitudes de l’esclavage, de l’isolement, … souvent imposée aux tchandalas … avaient
naître chez eux des vices contre nature … tous les peuples dites sémitiques en furent et en sont
encore infectés” (120).
60. “Ces pariahs égyptiens révoltés qui s’appelèrent les Hébreux” (218).
61. “Es ist die antiarische Religion par excellance: das Christentum die Umwertung aller
arischen Werthe, der Sieg der Tschandala-Werthe, das Evangelium den Armen, den Niedrigen
gepredigt, der Gesamt-Aufstand alles Niedergetretenen, Elenden, Missrathenen,
Schlechtweggekommenen gegen die ‘Rasse’—die unsterbliche Tschandala-Rache als Religion
der Liebe.”
62. “En copiant ces traditions indoues, le sémitisme chrétien y a ajouté quoi que ce soit” (94).

31

63. “Cette classe n’avait aucune existence légale … comme toutes les races abandonnées à la vie
de nature, les tchandalas se développèrent avec une extraordinaire rapidité. Issus des criminels de
toutes les castes, même des castes brahmes et xchatrias, ils ne tardèrent pas à former un
ensemble beaucoup plus intelligent, plus capable que la moyenne des soudras et même des
vaysias” (100).
64. “Seine Seele schielt; sein Geist liebt Schlupfwinkel, Schleichwege und Hinterthüren, alles
Versteckte muthet ihn an als seine Welt, seine Sicherheit, sein Labsal; er versteht sich auf das
Schweigen, das Nicht-Vergessen, das Warten, das vorläufige Sich-verkleinern, Sich-demüthigen.
Eine Rasse solcher Menschen des Ressentiment wird nothwendig endlich klüger sein als irgend
eine vornehme Rasse, sie wird die Klugheit auch in ganz andrem Maasse ehren: nämlich als eine
Existenzbedingung ersten Ranges.”
65. “Dem ältesten und ursprünglichsten Personen-Verhältniss, das es giebt … dem Verhältniss
zwischen Käufer und Verkäufer, Gläubiger und Schuldner: hier trat zuerst Person gegen Person,
hier mass sich zuerst Person an Person … Preise machen, Werthe abmessen, Äquivalente
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